In the spring of this year, a major shakeup in Moscow's military leadership significantly impacted Russia's border security in the Kursk province. Col. Gen. Alexander Lapin, the newly appointed military overseer, dismantled the security council responsible for safeguarding this vulnerable region. According to a Russian security services official, Lapin's belief was that the military alone had the necessary strength and resources to protect Russia’s borders. Unfortunately, this decision exposed yet another weak spot in Russia’s already strained border defenses, which came crashing down earlier this month when Ukrainian forces launched a surprise offensive into Kursk. Ukrainian troops crossed the border, finding Russian defenses in utter disarray. They surged forward and now claim to control over 400 square miles of Russian territory.
It’s crucial to understand that Col. Gen. Lapin wasn’t solely responsible for this debacle. He was grappling with a severe shortage of troops. However, his actions are indicative of a broader issue within Russia's top brass, who seem increasingly disconnected from the realities of the battlefield. This disconnect is a significant hurdle as Moscow struggles to drive Ukrainian forces back from its territory.
Since the onset of the war, the centralized, top-down approach characteristic of Vladimir Putin's Russia has been a double-edged sword. This rigid hierarchy has hampered effective planning and decision-making in the Kremlin. When plans go awry, the inability to adapt quickly has become a severe disadvantage. "Putin’s power vertical is still in place, but it’s currently undermining Russia’s objectives on the ground," explains William Courtney, a former American diplomat and adjunct senior fellow at Rand. "With the Kremlin controlling everything from the top, the response to unexpected, fast-moving events is severely impaired, leaving no room for ground-level initiative."
Whether the dissolved interagency council, which had brought together military officers with local and regional security officials, could have organized a more coherent response is debatable. What’s clear is that without a central coordinating body, Russia's reaction to the Ukrainian incursion has been chaotic and ineffective. Russian security agencies like the Interior Ministry and the Federal Security Service, responsible for domestic security, are in a scramble with the Defense Ministry, which is tasked with military operations inside Ukraine. "Russia is still piecing together its reaction to this Ukrainian incursion. The response has been rather slow and disorganized," noted Gen. Christopher Cavoli, NATO’s commander, during a recent Council on Foreign Relations discussion. "The problem partly stems from a lack of clarity on who’s actually in charge."
The Russian Defense Ministry has yet to comment publicly on how Ukrainian forces managed to cross into Russian territory. Hours after the incursion, Russia’s chief of general staff, Gen. Valery Gerasimov, claimed that Lapin’s forces and border guards were working to "destroy the enemy in areas directly adjacent to the Russian-Ukrainian border." However, Gerasimov has remained silent in public appearances since then.
The initial response to the Ukrainian incursion echoes the Kremlin’s reaction to the insurrection led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner Group mercenary leader who briefly marched toward Moscow to challenge his rivals, including Gerasimov and then-defense minister Sergei Shoigu. Despite clear signs that Prigozhin was planning an insurrection, the Kremlin was caught off guard and paralyzed. Prigozhin, who halted his rebellion before reaching Moscow, died two months later when his plane exploded mid-flight over Russia.
In the lead-up to the Ukrainian invasion, Russian military correspondents reported that Lapin’s command had warned Moscow about the buildup of Ukrainian forces on the front line. However, these warnings were dismissed, as similar tactics had been used by both sides in the past as psychological warfare. As a result, Russian forces under Lapin's command failed to take necessary defensive actions, such as fortifying lines or laying mines. When Ukrainian soldiers crossed into the no-man’s-land between Ukraine and Russia, they encountered little resistance and found no territorial defense forces to hinder their advance.
Ukrainian troops employed electronic jamming to disrupt communications, leaving Russian forces unable to contact their commanders. Lightly armed Russian troops were trapped behind the front line and scattered into the forest. Some mounted local resistance, ambushing Ukrainian forces, but many Russian soldiers, including conscripts, surrendered. "In Moscow, they simply did not anticipate that such a scenario could occur," remarks Konrad Muzyka, director of Poland-based Rochan Consulting, which specializes in Russian military analysis.
The disastrous planning for this defensive failure mirrors the initial invasion’s blunders. Russian military planners, relying on flawed intelligence and an overestimation of Ukrainian vulnerabilities, sent armored columns into Ukraine in a parade formation, making them easy targets for drones and anti-tank weapons. Similarly, when Ukrainian forces entered Russia, their first armed resistance came from the 488th motor rifle regiment of the 144th motor rifle brigade, a unit predominantly made up of conscripts. These conscripts, under Russian policy, were not supposed to be fighting inside Ukraine. Depleted by the ongoing conflict, the unit was poorly equipped, initially fielding only 10 to 20 armored vehicles instead of the standard 120.
This isn’t Lapin’s first encounter with poor planning and manpower shortages. In September 2022, Ukrainian forces launched a surprise attack in northeast Ukraine, exploiting thinly fortified Russian positions with fast-moving vehicles and heavier armored units. Russian defenses crumbled, allowing Ukraine to reclaim thousands of square miles. Following this debacle, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov publicly criticized Lapin, calling for his resignation and suggesting he should be demoted to private and sent to the front lines. Despite some criticism of the fairness of this assessment, Lapin was eventually removed from his position, only to be later reappointed as deputy commander of Russian forces in Ukraine.
The chaos from these failures led the Kremlin to reconsider its manpower issues. By October 2022, Russia initiated a general mobilization to bolster its defenses. Since then, financial incentives for contract service have been successful in attracting new volunteers, with about 1,000 signing up daily. While this influx has helped maintain Russia’s military efforts in a grinding war of attrition, high casualties have eroded strategic reserves, limiting Russia's ability to allocate resources effectively to Kursk.
Now, as Russia attempts to regain the upper hand on its own soil, it’s redeploying some forces from eastern Ukraine, despite the risk of weakening its front lines. This botched response has highlighted Ukraine’s strategic advantage and Moscow’s critical weakness in contingency planning. “It has certainly showcased the creativity and battlefield prowess of the Ukrainians,” notes Pentagon spokesman Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder. “They’ve clearly managed to push the Russians into a tough spot, forcing them to struggle with their response.”
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